**SUMMARY**

The Polkadot runtime upgrade to v1.1.2 introduced an unintentional breaking change that prevented three staking accounts from receiving staking rewards across multiple eras. This proposal seeks to reimburse these accounts for the rewards they should have earned for backing validators and securing the network.

The process was detailed by core developer gpestana in multiple articles compiled in the following Polkadot Forum post:

[Recover corrupted Staking ledgers in Polkadot and Kusama](https://forum.polkadot.network/t/recover-corrupted-staking-ledgers-in-polkadot-and-kusama/9796)

The referendum could not be proposed until the runtime upgrade to v1.4.0, which corrected the balance state of one of the affected accounts ([PR 538](https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/runtimes/pull/538)).

**TIMELINE**

*   2024-02-19 Breaking change introduced in runtime upgrade v1.1.2
*   2024-03-15 Hotfix on runtime upgrade to v1.1.3.
*   2024-10-15 Runtime upgrade to v1.3.3 set the correct ledger/stash status.
*   2025-02-26 The balance issue for one of the accounts was corrected on runtime v.1.4.0.

**PROPOSAL DETAILS**

Each account faced a unique situation, and the analysis took into account the bonded funds at the time rewards ceased, the number of eras the payee account went without receiving rewards, and the average APY during that period.

Below is the information for each affected account:

Affected account: 138fZsNu67JFtiiWc1eWK2Ev5jCYT6ZirZM288tf99CUHk8K

*   Payee account: **12YcbjN5cvqM63oK7WMhNtpTQhtCrrUr4ntzqqrJ4EijvDE8**
*   Last era with rewards: [1400](https://polkadot.subscan.io/extrinsic/20169733-4?event=20169733-1224)
*   Last bonded balance before not receiving rewards (DOT): 8,556
*   Last era with no rewards: [1597](https://polkadot.subscan.io/extrinsic/23007919-2?event=23007919-627)
*   Eras without rewards: 197
*   Average APY during that period (%): 17.18
*   Missing rewards (DOT): **1,603.46**

Affected account: 15bt67qghz8hJxCUPgAXmzVxUBHLpPN41RVm2nwMFyLWByVE

*   Payee account: **15bt67qghz8hJxCUPgAXmzVxUBHLpPN41RVm2nwMFyLWByVE**
*   Last era with rewards: 1646  
    During era 1526, the stash account 14kwUJW6rtjTVW3RusMecvTfDqjEMAt8W159jAGBJqPrwwvC was [wrongly scored with 0](https://polkadot.subscan.io/extrinsic/21972815-4?event=21972815-77) in the 'voterlist'. However, the account 15bt67 kept receiving rewards until era 1646. During era 1683, the account 14kwUJ 'voterlist' score [was updated](https://polkadot.subscan.io/extrinsic/24214751-3?event=24214751-64) and the same account started to receive rewards at era 1684.
*   Last bonded balance before not receiving rewards (DOT): 4,261
*   Last era with no rewards: 1683
*   Eras without rewards: 37
*   Average APY during that period (%): 12.93
*   Missing rewards (DOT): **587.11**

Affected account: 12gmcL9eej9jRBFT26vZLF4b7aAe4P9aEYHGHFzJdmf5arPi

*   Payee account: **12gmcL9eej9jRBFT26vZLF4b7aAe4P9aEYHGHFzJdmf5arPi**
*   Last era with rewards: [1402](https://polkadot.subscan.io/extrinsic/20198278-3?event=20198278-112)
*   Last bonded balance before not receiving rewards (DOT): 7,110
*   Last era with no rewards: 1613
*   Eras without rewards: 211
*   Average APY during that period (%): 16.96
*   Missing rewards (DOT): **1,313.76**

- **Problem Statement:** Polkadot runtime upgrade v1.1.2 caused three staking accounts to miss rewards, impacting network security.
- **Significance:** Reimbursement is crucial to restore trust and incentivize network participation.
- **Proposed Solution:** Reimburse affected accounts based on bonded funds, eras without rewards, and average APY.
- **Expected Outcomes:** Restored rewards for affected accounts, enhancing network security and participant trust.

#1007 Reimbursement for corrupted staking ledgers

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