[PULLED - Watch out for MEDIUM PRESSURE proposal]
Growth Pressure Capped & Stepped Supply Schedule
This proposal is an alternative to 1709 and 1710, with one substantial improvement: We introduce a pool for algorithmic growth incentives to create DOT demand drivers and grow the economy.
- Reduce inflation by 33% every two years
- Effective supply cap of 2.1b DOT
- Introduce a system account "growth incentives" towards which a variable share of the inflation is directed
Just hammering down inflation is dangerous
The other proposals are good, but have a problem: They only address supply, but not demand.
If we remove incentives to stake DOT, and the DOT has no place to go and nothing productive to do, it might go idle and further reduce DOT demand, reducing price and further disincentivize holding DOT, sending DOT into a dangerous downward trajectory. It is unclear how much additional demand the psychological effect of a supply cap can create and is a purely speculative bet. Too risky for a multi-billion dollar asset.
Tokenomics policy needs to create demand for DOT
The main problem with current tokenomics is not they are creating too much supply, it is that they are creating too little demand. There is no incentive to use DOT in parachains. Even worse, there is a disincentive, because the staking APR is too damn high. Even an inflation halving will not eliminate this problem.
The primary driver of DOT demand can only come from the economy. In Polkadot, parachains are the economy. Right now, only 0.7% of DOT are used on parachains for economic activity. 54% are staked. 45% are idle. The DOT economy is practically non-existent.
Good DOT tokenomics has to answer the question: How do we create demand for DOT?
To create DOT demand, it is not enough to just sharpen the supply curve. We need to actively create demand drivers. For this, we need policy levers. The "Growth Incentives" pool is such a policy lever.
Creating an Economic Growth Incentive Pool
The idea of introducing a buffer fund that captures unused inflation for economic policy was recently discussed by Gavin Wood at the Web3 Summit 2025: Closing Keynote Day 1 - Gavin Wood - Web3 Summit 2025 @ 41:26
This proposal suggests to introduce such a mechanism: an account that receives a variable share of the inflation that neither goes to stakers nor the Treasury. Governance can control how many staking rewards are distributed and direct any excess amounts to the buffer fund.
The buffer fund shall be used through algorithmic mechanisms to stimulate economic growth or be directed back to staking rewards when needed. By introducing a growth incentive pool that can only be distributed indirectly and algorithmically and not through direct OpenGov decisions, we retain an important economic policy lever.
Currently, inflation in Polkadot is distributed as follows:
- 85% staking rewards
- 15% Treasury income
By introducing a new account and an additional variable under control of OpenGov, the distribution can now be changed, such that for example:
- 64% staking rewards
- 15% Treasury income
- 21% buffer fund
The initial distribution share proposed in the remark of this proposal is illustrated below:
This distribution share would in the first year effectively cut staking rewards in half (102m->51m DOT), remove 1/3 from the Treasury (18m->12m DOT), and set up the new Growth Incentives Pool with 17m DOT per year.
The share distribution could be configurable, so that it can be adapted by future governance decisions.
Example mechanisms
The distribution mechanism itself is not part of the proposal. But for a better understanding of what could be done algorithmically I share two existing ideas: Economic Growth Incentives and Optimistic Project Funding.
I have laid out one algorithmic mechanism in the forum post Economic Growth Incentives. There I argue that we can algorithmically allocate DOT to parachains in proportion to how much each parachain sovereign account has captured in non-staked DOT. This creates a virtouous cycle of economic growth, letting parachains compete for DOT incentives, forcing innovation and a race to capture DOT. It also eliminates the disincentive for DeFi to capture hundreds of millions of USD in DOT. The effect is that hundreds of millions of USD worth of DOT gets pulled into the economy and sets the ecosystem on a new growth trajectory.
Economic Growth Incentives is also described in a video here:
Video: Economic Growth Incentives
Another potential model is Optimistic Project Funding, which received 55m AYes on the WFC track.
Include the pool in the tokenomics decision now to secure this important economic policy lever
I strongly believe we must not rush decisions that affects billions of USD of market cap. We need to determine the exact model through calm and logical economic research led by the resources and personnel currently only available to the W3F.
Ref 1710 is way too harsh by reducing inflation by 54%. It would reduce staking rewards to 47m DOT and Treasury income to 8m DOT. After this reduction, there will be no more room to accumulate funds for the buffer fund until the ideas suggested by Gavin Wood would be implemented, which currently has an inderminate timeline.
We need to act on economic growth now. We have the tools to introduce the pool at hand, so we should not wait.
It is important that we do not lock us out of incentivicing economic growth by hammering down inflation without any room to move policy levers. If a hard staking reward reduction is enacted, we must also set aside DOT to the economic growth incentive pool.
The current proposal maintains all the benefits of 1710 (supply cap + staking rewards halving) but mitigates the risk of not being able to counter a deadly downward spiral.
If we will not find agreement on the mechanism, we can still discard the idea and burn the incentive pool later.
Comments (5)
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Please note that while this ref is intended to appear like the Capped & Stepped supply refs (Soft Pressure - Ref 1709 & Hard Pressure - Ref 1710), it is not related to the initiative and possibly intended to confuse.
This model introduces a "Revenue Pot" as a new concept despite being introduced by Gav at the Web3 Summit. It also unfortunately locks us into a division of income based on a new and scarcely-discussed idea.
It erroneously suggests that without establishing a "Growth Incentives" system account today, we will lose our chance to do so in the future. This is false.
In both scenarios the immediate following action is to establish the Revenue Pot Gav mused about at Web3 Summit to immediately get to work reducing expenses by 80%.
This ref suggests taking it a step beyond consensus on Pot creation to forcing a decision on how the funds should be split with a large portion going to a concept only discussed publicly 9 days before posting here.
Furthermore, this model proposed does NOT have "the same impact as [Hard Pressure]" as it claims. It reaches cap in 2036, a severely truncated runway & features heavier inflation up front.
The rushed hijacking of the proposals' brand and resulting confusion is not welcome at this time!
Personally I am not against the development of this"Growth Incentives" idea and it remains in play with either the Hard or Soft pressure models. I'm not convinced, however, it is useful to enshrine this early-stage idea with a Wish for Change.
Honestly I'm not a fan of allocating more DOT in form of growth rewards for parachain DOT "capturing".
I actually think it should be the complete opposite. Parachains are living rent free on polkadot which is providing pretty much all infrastructure + security. The fact that parachains are not paying enough for cores is actually putting the network at risk since it doesn't create enough economic value for DOT to keep it's market cap (economic security).
Also, parachains all have their own tokens. What is the difference between a growth fund for parachains for "capturing" DOT and a growth fund to pay ETH and SOL to "capture DOT"?
The funding should come from proposal as the Hydration proposal and not automatically for every parachain that creates a derivative of DOT based on growth fund rewards.
In my view, specially with the "hub" supporting PVM / EVM contracts would be to increase the miminum price per core to 1000 DOT.
If a parachain doesn't have enough revenue to pay 1000 DOT / $4000 every 28 days then it should become a smart contract on the hub and pay DOT fees there.
Parachains are paying $40 a month for polkadot security (this is the price of a very small machine on AWS).
On the other hand if we take incentives to stake and move DOT to parachains we are weakening the network security and rewarding parachains just for using DOT in their products.