**Goal of the Proposal:**

- To rebond all balances related to the attack.
- The approach does not impact the sovereignty of the funds but delays availability of funds
- It allows the Parallel team to win time and explore alternatives to regaining control of their parachain governance. 

**Context:**

An account took control over Parallel Fi governance, upgraded the parachain's runtime and used it to transfer out over DOT and USDT. The account executed a malicious runtime upgrade, introducing a custom "sudo" pallet, granting themselves administrative privileges on the parachain. Through the proxy account, they successfully transferred DOT from three of the parachain’s DOT staking ledger accounts to their account. To obfuscate the trail, the account moved assets across parachains: including from AssetHub USDT to Moonbeam (most channels between parachains have been closed by now). The account is still actively unstaking staked DOT through an added proxy.

To fix this a root proposal is needed: however given the time calculated until unstaking ends, might make a root proposal unsuccessful. This whitelisted proposal aims to issue a simple rebond call to restake the DOT to buy additional 28 days of time for Parallel: providing time for the team to look into options to regain control of its parachain governance. The addresses in which DOT is to be rebonded are:

`14quGMw2tot6JxY2wSyk1Vc1uns3EmMRs2eQS2C66Mdv6uE9` (22.649 DOT) `19cnUyebu52RUt4Rt67brDmmnVdaDD37xdxKbaJ7tuLnLfu` (74.614 DOT) `16kTs7tsJ6tYYWAXSWDmm4vYnRTFPWEhXTk4rNCtbw6NRvte` (1.566 DOT) `16ZbwPMyrp9yTbPScDqm9btzcNVKKQ5MHcMQp4rA1ztF4sBA` (101.322 DOT) `1dMif8G4jrXsdPSkvF87uBfaiahh2EvC9fPnsi91v4i1xKC` (3.413 DOT)

These addresses hold Parallel Fi funds.

Call data: [here](https://polkadot.js.org/apps/?rpc=wss%3A%2F%2Fpolkadot-rpc.dwellir.com#/extrinsics/decode/0x1500160d02d721ec7d460998cc42686dbb0f57ea9d59f1e2380eaf371fd1fadb72ef3d817ce8000000010a000000).

Preimage hash: [here](https://polkadot.js.org/apps/?rpc=wss%3A%2F%2Fpolkadot-rpc.dwellir.com#/extrinsics/decode/0x0a00a10317031a02141a030001aa006b3de1565c48ade1c1f3b646090be49389327f6b214076e5d2bd2ba0fb0207130b0018f7c7a2cb1a03000106926c6bab20739b8d4710e56a9ce6db7b0f67986a4f29664919620653f3a43507130f00e0dadd4ca4021a030001fe5326ff816ac945120d53cffdd00919268032f0e478d40c23dea72a69e5366007130b002c14b9f50b1a030001f60aa184555b35cfcd6dc246424240068da18dd1bfeefccf8d5a26713b9917f707130f00f01b1c6682031a0300011bba940dce8f85a0088315d47c39f4318a107cff37333206e40f227c90a3f6a007130b000cea6ec41c).

This proposal, given its root need, has been submitted via Whitelisted Caller Track. A proposal to whitelist the submission is up for vote on Technical Fellowship as well. Please note that relay chain is **not** affected by this event but we aim to assist the Parallel parachain community in taking back control of these accounts. 

Please make sure to review and vote at your convenience!

**Problem Statement:**
- Modify the parachain storage call to re-bond unstaking balances related to an attack on Parallel Fi governance.

**Significance:**
- Attacker gained control over governance, transferred out DOT and USDT, and is actively unstaking DOT.
  
**Proposed Solution:**
- Whitelisted proposal to re-bond unstaking balances related to the attack, providing time for the Parallel team to explore options to regain control.

**Expected Outcomes:**
- Delay availability of funds, allowing time for Parallel team to address governance control issues.

#1322 Referendum #1322: Rebond DOT from Parallel Fi accounts - Description below

No Active Proposals